UNDER THE PORTCULLIS AND INSIDE THE
GOLDEN CASTLE: AMERICAN PIPE &
CONSTRUCTION CO. v. UTAH

[An] obvious advantage which accrues to every member of the
class at commencement, whether he knows he's a member of the
class or not, is tolling the statute of limitations ....
Defense counsel will soon learn that this... aid extends to the jackals who hang
back until the tiger has downed the stag ready for the kill. The
miracle of an action under the new rule 23 [sic] is that it tolls the
statute of limitations for the dull, the lazy, the timid, the sly, and
if he is there among them, the unfortunate who has really been injured.'
A statute of limitations usually operates as a bar to the legal
remedy on a plaintiff's cause of action 2 occasioned by a lapse of
time since his cause of action arose.3 The timely commencement

of an action to enforce a right before the appropriate statute of
limitations has run ordinarily suspends the running of the statute
with regard to that particular action. 4 The establishment of statutes of limitations is considered a legislative prerogative. 5
Among the actions that a plaintiff may initiate, and which will
result in the tolling of the statute of limitations, insofar as the
named plaintiff is affected, is the representative suit or class action. 6 A class action is a suit typically prosecuted by a member of
1. Donelan, The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Class Suit Under
New Rule 23, as Seen by the Treble Damage Plaintiff, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
L.J. 264, 266 (1968).
2. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 618 (1895); Michigan Ins. Bank
v. Eldred, 130 U.S. 693, 696 (1889).
3. Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290, 300 (1866).
4. Linn & Lane Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 574, 578 (1915);
Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Randolph, 217 U.S. 547, 554 (1910).
5. Saranac Land and Timber Co. v. Comptroller, 177 U.S. 318, 324
(1900); Rand v. Bossen, 27 Cal. 2d 61, 65, 162 P.2d 457, 459 (1945).
6. Courts of Equity have long recognized that a representative or small
group of representatives should have the right to sue on behalf of themselves and for others similarly situated and thereby represent an entire class
or body of persons interested in the litigation where their number was so
great that joinder was impossible or impracticable. Smith v. Swormstedt,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 622
(1915).
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a group on behalf of all other members of the group for the purpose of adjudicating in a single action disputes between the group
and an adverse party where joinder of all the members of the group
is either impracticable or impossible.1 It can be inferred that the
commencement of the class action will toll the statute of limitations for the named representative of the class. This comment will
discuss to what extent the commencement of a class suit tolls the
statute of limitations for the benefit of unnamed or absent members of the class who would have been barred by the statute of
limitations from instituting their own individual suits. American
Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah8 is a recent United States Supreme
Court decision that recites and establishes a confluent rationale
for tolling the statute of limitations, under purportedly limited and
narrow circumstances, for the benefit of all asserted members of
the class upon the commencement of the class suit.
THE LEGAL BACKDROP

A.

OriginalRule 23

The class action as set forth in the original Rule 23(a) 9 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was regarded by the federal
courts as defining three different species of class actions, 10 predicating the distinction upon "the jural relationship among the
class members with regard to the right sued upon."' 1 The "true"
class action involved a class in which the right sought to be en7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a); 7 C.

WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
CIVI § 1759 at 572-73 (1972).
8. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a), prior to the 1966 amendment, provided in perti-

AND PRocEDURE:

nent part:

(a)

Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be
sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced
for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right
and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to
enforce it;

(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication

of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a common relief is
sought.
10. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969), reh. denied, 394 U.S. 1025
(1969).
11. 3B J. Mooan's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.30 at 23.501 (2d ed. 1974).
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forced by or against the class was joint, common, secondary, or derivative. 12 The "hybrid" class action "involved situations in which
the rights sought to be enforced by or against the class were several, and the object of the action was the adjudication of claims affecting specific property."' 3 The "spurious" class action under Rule
23(a) (3) involved the enforcement of rights whose character was
several, and there existed "a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief was sought.' 4 The
spurious class suit was viewed as a permissive joinder device in
which the rights and liabilities of each individual plaintiff were
distinct.15 It was merely an invitation to all persons similarly situated to join the action and litigate the several claims, and had a
binding effect only on those plaintiffs who became parties to the
action. 16 An absent member of a spurious class became an actual
member to the action by intervening under Federal Rule 24.17 This
in turn raised problems when an absentee member attempted to intervene at a time when an individual action initiated by him would
have been barred by an applicable statute of limitations. In spurious class actions, court holdings conflicted as to the circumstances
under which intervention was to be permitted and as to the appropriate time for intervention.18
The question of whether the statute of limitations was tolled
upon the commencement of a spurious class action remained uncertain and never was resolved by the United States Supreme
12. Id.
13. Id. at 23.502.
14. Id.
15. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969); Developments in the Law
-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HAzv. L. REV. 874, 930
(1958).
16. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 99 (1966).
17. 3B J. Moories FEDERAL PRACTICE f 23.10 [1] at 23-2606 (2d ed. 1974).
18. See Union Carbide v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588-89 (10th Cir. 1961)
for a list of the various positions and supporting authorities on this subject.
Note that the commencement of a suit tolled the statute of limitations in
both the true and hybrid class actions as to all members of the class. Richmond v. Irons, 121 U.S. 27 (1887); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.,

39

F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1941), remanded,

123 F.2d

979 (3d Cir. 1941).

The rationale for this concept appeared to be based on the fact that a judgment in a true class action bound all members of the class and the judgment in a hybrid class action bound all members of the class as to their
rights in the specific property involved in the action. 3B J. MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 123.11[2] at 23-2821, et. seq. (2d. ed. 1974).

Court.' 9 On the question of whether absent members of a spurious
class could be permitted to join or intervene as parties after the
running of a limitation period that barred their own claims, a ma20
jority of the courts concluded that such intervention was proper.
If we are to give full recognition to the representative character of
the action we must hold that the statute of limitations is tolled for
those in whose behalf the representative 21action is brought as well
as for those who actually bring the action.
Other courts concluded that each member attempting to intervene and participate in the action would be compelled to satisfy
the timeliness requirement. 2 2 A spurious class "involves separate
causes of action, and is a matter of efficiency to avoid multiplicity
of action. Consequently, each plaintiff must be able to avoid the
bar of the statute of limitations without reference to the other
23
causes of action."
19. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 550.
20. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd
on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
As to suits under (3),

. .

. the Rule unequivocally tells all persons

having claims of the type therein described that one or more of
them may begin such a class action 'on behalf of all' when the
'class' is 'so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them
all before the court.' Any non-accepting noteholders, relying on
that assurance, were justified in believing that plaintiff's suit was
begun on their behalf although they were not before the court. To
hold that such noteholders cannot, as to lapse of time, have the
benefit, by intervention, of the institution of the suit by plaintiff
would be to convert the Rule into a trap. Since, in a class under
clause (3), a judgment will not intervene, we suggest that if, after
trial, the court finds against the defendant, appropriate steps be
taken to notify all such noteholders to intervene .

. .

judgment

to be entered in favor only of those who do so within a reasonable
time.
Id., at 529. See also, Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 340 F.2d 731
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963); Union Carbide Corp. v.
Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou
Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
21. Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965).
22. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.
1941); Athas v. Day, 161 F. Supp. 916 (D. Colo. 1958).
While tolling of the statute is of great benefit to members of the
class, it should not be rationalized on the basis of the reliance of
silent members on those who are bringing the action. One can only
speculate on the percentage of each class who failed to bring an
action because of their reliance on the original suit as compared
to those who carelessly or otherwise let the statutory period expire
and are taking advantage of an unexpected windfall.
Comment, Spurious Class Actions Based on Securities Fraudsunder the Revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 35 FoRD. L. Rzv. 295, 308 (1966).
See also, Slack v. Stiner, 358 F.2d 65, 69-70 (5th Cir. 1966).
23. Athas v. Day, 161 F. Supp. 916, 919 (D. Colo. 1958).
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B.

New Rule 2324

The 1966 revision of Rule 23 apparently eliminated 25 the former
right-oriented categories. 2 6 The Rule now specifically provides that
a judgment rendered in a class action is binding on all those the
court may determine to be members of the class and who -do not
request exclusion.2 7 Class actions are now permitted only under
circumstances which are deemed to make such an action appropriate. 26 Class actions maintainable under subdivision (b) (3) require
that common questions of law and fact predominate over questions
affecting merely individuals and that the class action is superior
to any other method of adjudicating the controversy.2 9 The nature of a (b) (3) class, despite the apparent elimination of the "spurious" tag, is the same as the old suprious class action in that the
rights of the class are several and there are predominate questions
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of
a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained
as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (3).
26. 3B J. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE [ 23.08- 23.10[7], 23-2505 - 23-2751
(2d ed. 1974).
27. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 105 (1966). The committee
noted that the terms used as the basis of the classification had proved "obscure and uncertain." Id. at 98.
28. Id. at 99.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3).

of law and fact which are common to the members of the class.8 0
The relatively slight relationship between class members in the
(b) (3) class creates the possibility that a class member could be
affected by the judgment of the suit without his knowledge or acquiescence. 31 The 1966 amendments assure that members will be
identified before trial on the merits: [T]he action will have been
early determined to be a class or nonclass action, and in the former
case the judgment, whether or not favorable, will include the class,
as above stated.13 2 A determination of whether the action will be
maintained as a class action is made "[a] s soon as practicable after
the commencement of an action brought as a class action ..... s
The Rule further requires that the "best notice practicable under
the circumstances '3 4 be afforded all members of the 23(b) (3)
class, informing them that a suit has been initiated in their behalf
and that they will be bound by the judgment of the court unless
they request exclusion from the class.
Under present Rule 23, with the elimination of one-way intervention by extending the res judicata effect of a judgment to absentees,
there should remain no conceptual or practical obstacles in the path
of holding that statutes of limitations are tolled by the commencement of a class suit for all members of the class as subsequently
determined. 35 If the statute was not tolled, the class members
30. Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the Development of Amended Rule 23, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 254, 261 (1966).
31. Involuntary Dismissals of Class Actions, 40 U. Cm. L. R. 783, 786
(1973). This problem had its roots in old rule 23 where there existed the
potential for one-way intervention, a phenomenon whereby a member could
join in the class after a favorable judgment and thereby reap the full benefits thereof, or, where there was an unfavorable judgment, remain outside
of the class and not be bound. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,
300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961); 2 W.

BARRON

& A.

HOLTZOFF,

FEDERAL

PRACTICE

§ 568 (rev. ed. Wright 1961); Kalven & Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cmi. L. REv. 684 (1941); Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71
AMD PROCEDURE,

HARV.L. REV. 874, 935 (1958).

32. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 106 (1966).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) and 23(c) (3).
35. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968); Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 460-61 (E.D. Pa.
1968). Although the commencement of a class action does not give the
defendant notice of the precise number of plaintiffs in the class, he is still
adequately apprised of the need to prepare his case. Minnesota v. United
States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 575-76 (D. Minn. 1968). "There should
be no problem with regard to the statute of limitations under the amended
rule. Since the judgment is now binding in all class actions, commencement of the action should toll the statute of limitations for all members
of the class." Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 184-85 (1969).
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might be forced to intervene or file precautionary suits, a procedure that would be wasteful, expensive and time-consuming for
both litigant and court, thereby frustrating a principal function of
a class suit.3 6
[T]he class action determination, whenever made, relates back to
the date of filing [citation omitted]. Where the class action determination is affirmative, the court is merely declaring that the action
may be 'maintained' as a class action, and it seems reasonably clear
determination relates back to the date of filing the comthat this
37
plaint.

Thus, when the court determines that an action is maintainable as
a class suit, such determination relates back to the commencement
of the suit for all individuals who may subsequently be determined as members of the class.
The difficult problems arise where, after the commencement of
a class suit, the court determines that the suit should not proceed
in class form. On this subject the Advisory Committee Notes do
not provide adequate guidance:
[T]he question of whether the intervenors in the nonclass action
shall be permitted to claim... the benefit of the date of the commencement of the action for purposes of the statute of limitations
jurisdiction
are to be decided by reference to the laws governing
and limitations as they apply in particular contexts.3 8

If the statute in such a situation is not tolled, then class litigants
could assure their participation in the judgment by filing precautionary individual actions or motions to intervene as parties resulting in "precisely the multiplicity of activity which Rule 23 was
designed to avoid.. .."39
The only case prior to American Pipe and Construction Co. v.
Utah that addressed itself to this problem was Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co.40 Where the determina36. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-3 (1966).
37. Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D.
452, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
38. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 104 (1966).
39. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 551. "This
result [tolling of the statute] should be reached even if the court, for reasons of judicial housekeeping, ultimately holds that it will not allow the
suit to proceed as a class action, since otherwise members of the class would
have to file .. .protective suit[s] pending that determination." Wright,
supra note 35, at 184-85.
40. 43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1968).

tion of the maintainability of the action as, a class is negative,
"... it does not necessarily follow that the case must be treated
as if there never was an action brought on behalf of absent class
members."

41

If the reason for the negative determination is failure to meet the
pre-requisites of 23 (a) or even if the reason is that the common
questions do not predominate over individual questions under
23 (b) (3) it would seem reasonable to conclude that such negative
determination also relates back to the filing of the complaint. If
there never really was a class to be represented, members of the
purported class can scarcely be heard to claim that they started
suit, vicariously, before the limitations period expired. But if the
reason for the negative determination stems from a weighing of

various considerations of judicial housekeeping, it may well be that
the decision should not relate back to the commencement of the
action, and that, at the very least, an opportunity should be presented for proof of reliance upon pendency of the purported class

42
action sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.

Thus, according to Judge Fullam of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, if a purported class action is dismissed because of failure to
satisfy the essential requirements of a class suit, then the purported members should not receive any tolling benefits. Conversely, if the action meets all of the fundamental requirements of
a class suit and yet is dismissed due to reasons of judicial housekeeping then the class members should receive the benefit of the
tolling of the statute of limitations. Judge Fullam, however, did
not suggest what the effect should be if all the prerequisites of a
class suit but one exist and whether the absent members of this
purported class should receive the benefit of the date of commencement of the class suit in calculating tolled time under a statute of
limitations.
From under this backdrop emerges American Pipe.
Ai
A.

cAN PIPE & CONSTRUCTION Co. v. UTAH

The Early Cases

The genesis of American Pipe occurred in early 1964 when a federal grand jury indicted a group of individuals and companies for
conspiracy in the restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust
laws.43 The defendants pleaded nolo contendere and judgments of
guilty were entered. At about the same time the United States
initiated civil suits in order to restrain future violations. 44 These
41. Id.
42. Id.

43. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 540.
44. It should be noted that the injunctive relief was initially sought in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California. It
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suits culminated in the entering of a "final judgment" on May 24,
1968, whereby the defendant parties consented to a decree enjoining them from engaging in specified future violations of the anti4

trust laws.

5

On May 13, 1969, eleven days short of a year after the entering
of the final judgment, the State of Utah commenced a class action suit against the parties named in the West Coast Pipe cases
alleging a Sherman Act conspiracy to rig prices in the sale of concrete and steel pipe. Utah purported to represent all public bodies
and agencies of state and local government in Utah and states in
the western area who were ultimate consumers of pipe acquired
from defendants. The applicable federal statute of limitations
governing antitrust suits was satisfied and the action was therefore found to be timely. 4 6 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the Central District of California for
assignment to Judge Martin Pence who had been actively involved
as judge in more than 100 actions arising out of the same factual
situation.

47

On December 4, 1969, the court entered an order that the action
should not be maintained as a class action. 48 Even though the
was in this court that the various litigants encountered Judge Martin Pence.
45. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 540-41 & n.1.
46. "Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the
United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, . . . the running of the statute of limitations in respect of every
private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in
part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended
during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter . .. ." Clayton
Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970). The Clayton Act further provides
that "[a]ny action to enforce any cause of action [under the antitrust laws]
shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause
of action accrued." 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970). The Clayton statute of limitations was enacted in order to remedy the confusion and disparity that resulted from the absence of a federal statute of limitations and the consequent reliance by the federal courts on the varying limitations provisions
applicable under state law. S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955);

H. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1955).

See also Handier, Twenty-

Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COL. L. REV. 1, 32-42 (1972).
47. In re West of the Rockies Concrete Pipe Antitrust Cases, 303 F. Supp.
507, 508-9 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
48. Utah v. American Pipe and Construction Company, 49 F.R.D. 17, 20
(C.D. Cal. 1969). "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether
it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be condi-

prerequisites of a class action contained in Rule 23 (a) (2) through

(a) (4)49 had apparently been satisfied,5 ° Judge Pence found that

the members of the class described in the complaint were not, as
required under Rule 23(a) (1), so numerous that joinder of all such
entities was impracticable.5 1 Judge Pence relied on his earlier experience in the West Coast Pipe cases and apparently implied that
a class action under these circumstances could be inferior to other
52
available methods for the adjudication of the controversy.
Eight days later, on December 12, 1969, sixty towns, cities, and
water districts in Utah, all of whom had been claimed as members
in the class of the original action, filed motions to intervene, as of
right under Rule 24(a) (2) 5 or, in the alternative, by permission
under Rule 24(b) (2). 5 4 It appears that the reason for the petitions to intervene was to circumvent the bar of the statute of limitations by the relation back of their complaints to May 13, 1969,
the date of the commencement of the class action.
[T]he tolling of the statute of limitations on the government's
'Western Pipe' conspiracy cases ceased on May 24, 1969. Since only
the State of Utah, of all the parties now before this court, filed its
suit prior to that date, unless by one means or another the present
parties can somehow get under the now dropped portcullis and inside the golden castle of the Clayton Act, any Sherman [§]1 claim
for any injuries prior to the four years preceding the filing of these
motions are barred. 55
Judge Pence thus denied the would-be intervenors' motion by
concluding that the limitations period imposed by the Clayton
Act 6 had run as to all intervenors and had not been tolled by the
commencement of the class action in their behalf. 57
tional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits."
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (1).
49. Supra note 24.
50. 49 F.R.D. 17, 20 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
51. Id. at 24. See also note 24, supra.
52. 49 F.R.D. 17, 21 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall
be permitted to intervene in an action: . .. (2) when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone
may be permitted to intervene in an action: .

.

. (2) when an ap-

plicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of

law or fact in common ....

54. Id.
55. Utah v. American Pipe and Construction Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 101 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
56. Supra note 24.
57. 50 F.R.D. at 108.
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial
of leave to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) ". . . since, as a
practical matter, they would not be affected by any potential recovery by Utah.158 However, the appellate court reversed the District Court's denial of plaintiff's motions for permissive intervention. The Court held that commencement of a class action suit
tolled the statute of limitations for all members of the class until
they were ejected by force of the order denying class action. 59
If the order, through legal fiction, is to project itself backward in

time it must fictionally carry backward with it the class members
to whom it was directed, and the rights they presently possessed.

It cannot leave them temporarily stranded in the present.6 o
The Supreme Court Decision 1

B.

The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court in a unanimous
decision. Justice Stewart writing for the Court mentioned in
passing that the issue involved in the case was a "limited" one.62
The Court held that unnamed members of the class stood as parties
to the class suit until they received notice of the pendency of the
63
action and chose not to continue as members.
[T] he commencement of the action satisfied the purpose of the limparticipate
itation provision as to all those who might subsequently
64
in the suit as well as for the named plaintiffs.

The Court found that the absent class members who had not relied on or were even aware of the commencement of a class action
suit stood as parties to the suit for statute of limitations purposes.
Justice Stewart claimed that all potential class members are passive beneficiaries of a suit brought in their behalf until the court
determines that the suit is maintainable as a class action.6 5 "Not
until the existence and limits of the class have been established and
notice of membership has been sent does a class member have any
duty to take note of the suit. ....66
58. Utah v. American Pipe & Construction Co., 473 F.2d 580, 582 (9th
Cir. 1973).
59. Id. at 584.
60. Id.

61. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538.
62. Id. at 540.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 550-51.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 552.
Id.

A central argument of Judge Pence in denying intervention on
the grounds that the statute of limitations had run as to the absent parties was that the right to interpose the statute of limitations to the attempted tolling of § 5 (b) of the Clayton Act by Rule
23 is a substantive right and a "necessary segment of the total
sphere of antitrust legislation."67 An attempt to toll § 5(b) by the
means of Rule 23 is an abridgement of a substantive right and in
violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2072, a statute which enables the Supreme
Court to formulate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "Such
rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
"68

This court can but conclude that within the statutorily created antitrust universe §5 (b) cannot be retolled by any Rule to permit relation back of their several causes of action by intervenors attempting
to intervene in either class or non-class actions filed for violation
of the antitrust laws, after the tolling period of §5 (b) has ended.00

The Supreme Court argued that the mere fact that Congress has
specified a limitation period is not conclusive of the "substantive"
nature of the statute and does not make the statute immune from
an extension of the tolling period by "procedural" rules.

70

"The

proper test is not whether a time limitation is 'substantive' or
'procedural', but whether tolling the limitation in a given context
is consonant with the legislative scheme." 71
This above statement of Justice Stewart alludes to another problem area-the conflicting rationale between statutes of limitations
and class actions. In Escott v. Barchris Construction Co.,7 2 a decision rendered prior to the promulgation of amended Rule 23, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the commencement of a
spurious class action tolls the statute of limitations for the benefit
of the unnamed members of the class. 73

The holding was sup-

ported primarily by a policy consideration of subordinating the underlying rationale of the statute of limitations to that of the class
action. 74 The class action is a "device for vindicating claims which,
taken individually, are too small to justify legal action but which
are of significant size if taken as a group,"7 5 and its use should be
67. 50 F.R.D. at 108.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

50 F.R.D. at 108.
414 U.S. at 559.
Id. at 557-58 &n.29.
340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 733.

75. Id.
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6 The Court in American Pipe has apparently ratified
encouraged.777

this position.

The Supreme Court, by virtue of the holding in this case, has
tolled the prerequisites of 23(a) rather than the statute of limitations. The Court has determined that numerousness is not required for statute of limitations purposes. Perhaps the Court has
suggested that 23(a) (1) is not a required prerequisite-rather a
dispensable or optional prerequisite not unlike the classification of
classes contained in 23(b). If so, this ruling of the Court does not
square with Rule 23.
DROPPING THE PORTCULLIS

As already mentioned, Judge Fullam in the American Anaconda
case distinguished between "fundamental requirements" and "judicial housekeeping" reasons for disallowing the maintenance of a
class action. 78 The court implied that the fundamental requirements of a class action were contained in 23(a) and, for the purposes of a (b) (3) suit, may also include the requirement that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of
70
the class.
The new rule, as already noted, attempted to eliminate the jural
classifications of the old rule and establish effect-oriented standards for maintenance of a class action.8 0 These standards are
contained in 23 (a) and 23(b). The standards or prerequisites of a
class action found in 23 (a) are to be considered characteristic of all
class actions initiated under the new rule. However, mere satisfaction of 23 (a), even though "necessary," 8' is not sufficient for the
maintenance of the suit as a class. "Subdivision (b) describes the
additional elements which in varying situations justify the use of
a class action. '8 2 Rule 23 (b) describes a new tripartite classification of class actions.
76. Id.
77. 414 U.S. at 552-56.
78. 43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
79. Id.
80. FED. R. Cwv. P. 23 (c) (3).
81. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 100 (1966).
82. Id.

[As] everyone knows, the revision has taken the poetry out of Rule
23; we are said no longer to have the romantic and slightly risque

categories we used to have-the "true", "hybrid", and (most incongruous of all legal rubrics) the "spurious" class action. In reshuf-

fled and sharply redefined forms, the first two of the new subdivisions, (b) (1) and (b) (2), embrace the old "true" and "hybrid"
and a still open-ended range of other forms.

New subdivision

(b) (3) bears many resemblances to the old "spurious" category,
but it effects vital changes, and to avoid giving offense to the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court, or anyone else, I will try usto the
ually to refer antiseptically to "(b) (3)" actions rather than
8
illicit, outlawed, and patently counterfeit "spurious" ones. 3
Despite the attempt to wash our hands of "true", "hybrid", and
"spurious", in order to strike those adjectives from our federal civil
procedure vocabulary, their spirit has been reincarnated as the
new classifications of 23(b). The basis of these new categories are
in terms of the effects that class or nonclass treatment would have
on the legal rights of all the parties. In order that a class action
may be maintained, the prerequisites of 23 (a) must be satisfied and
one set of requirements designated as a subdivision under 23(b)
must also be met. A court, through its infinite wisdom and the
power conferred by Rule 23 (c) (1), shall deem whether the suit may
be maintained as a class action as soon as practicable after the
commencement of the suit.8 4 In authoring an order that denies
the maintainability of a class action, a court may rely on the
failure of the action to meet the requirements of 23 (a), or, in
the alternative, the requirements of 23(b). If the negative determination is based on failure to satisfy 23(a), the question of
whether the action can be categorized in a 23(b) subdivision becomes irrelevant. If 23(a) is satisfied, then the action must be
able to comply with the requirements of one of the categories delineated in 23 (b) and then the class action may be maintained.
Under 23 (b) (3) questions of law or fact common to those of the
class must predominate over those of individual members and the
class action must be the superior method of adjudicating these
questions. The subdivisions includes four factors to be included
when considering whether the requirements of 23 (b) (3) have been
met.s 5
It is the author's contention that the prerequisites of 23(a) are
in the form of a definition. The emphasis of this paragraph is
placed on the nature of the action and hinges on the common or
jural relationship between the parties. The categories of 23(b), in
83. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23,
43 F.R.D. 39, 43 (1968).
84. Fm. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3) (A) through (b) (3) (D).
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contrast, have assumed the contour of judicial guidelines for determining when a class suit should be maintained as such under
the circumstances of each individual case. Rule 23 (b) is concerned
solely with insuring the full adjudication of the rights and liabilities of all the parties to the action. Though criticism will probably stem from the use of Judge Fullam's terms, the contents of
23(a) should be designated "fundamental requirements" of a class
action, and the various elements of the categories delineated in
23 (b) should be labeled as "judicial housekeeping".
The authority of the trial judge in controlling the nature and
course of a class action has been greatly increased by Rule 23.86
This factor prompted Justice Black to recommend rejection of the
amended Rule.
I particularly think that every member of the Court should examine

with great care the amendments relating to class suits. It seems
to me that they place too much power in the hands of the trial
judges and that the rules might almost as well simply provide that
'class suits can be maintained either for or against particular groups
whenever in the discretion of a judge he thinks it wise.' The power
given to the judge to dismiss such suits or to divide them up into
groups at will subjects members of classes to dangers that could
not follow froms 7carefully prescribed legal standards enacted to control class suits.

Without discussing the merits of this increased power in the
hands of trial judges, it must be noted that such power plays a
leading role in the judicial determination of the maintainability of

an action as a class suit. A negative determination of the 23(b)
(3) action may be based on one of many grounds. Frequently,
fundamental requirement or judicial housekeeping reasons for disallowing the maintenance of the class suit are interchangeable and
the rationale utilized is dependent solely upon the discretion of the
trial judge.
In American Pipe, the district court judge held as unreasonable
the State of Utah's contention that over 800 state entities could be
involved in the class litigation and therefore the suit failed to satisfy the numerousness requirement of 23 (a) (1).88 The court, how86. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3), 23(c), and 23(d).

87. Mr. Justice Black's Statement [on the Transmittal of the Amend-

ments to the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure], 39 F.R.D.
272, 274 (1966).
88. 49 F.R.D. 17, 20 (C.D. Cal. 1969).

ever, further stated that joinder would be a more appropriate procedure.8 9 It is arguable, therefore, that the trial judge could have
held that the class action was not superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy under
23 (b) (3), a judicial housekeeping reason.
In the light of the Supreme Court's rationale for its decision in
American Pipe, it does not appear probable that this case will be
relegated to the status of a case decided on narrow and limited
grounds. Quite the contrary. Probably, a tolling of statutes of limitations will accrue to the benefit of absent members where the
class as an action is defeated on other grounds, such as failure to
comply with 23(a) (4) which calls for adequate representation.
Perhaps only where the class suit is completely frivolous will the
absent members of the purported class be barred by the statute of
limitations.
CONCLUSION

Under the above extension of the holding in American Pipe, the
fundamental requirements can apparently be broken down into
two categories: The physical composition prerequisites of 23(a) (1)
and 23(a) (4), and the substantive prerequisites of 23(a) (2) and
23 (a) (3). The physical composition prerequisites are subordinated
to the substantive when the court considers the tolling effects on
a statute of limitations. The skeletal remnants of Rule 23 rest
solely in prerequisites 23(a) (2) and 23(a) (3), whose presence is
essential if a statute of limitations shall be tolled. These elements
of a class action, viewed alone, are generally not unlike the requirements of Permissive Joinder of Parties 0 and Permissive Intervention.91 The theme that underlines all three procedural concepts is
the notion of common questions of law and fact.
Under Rules 20 and 24(b), however, the individual who is joined
or who intervenes must independently satisfy the statute of limitations requirement. Under Rule 23 a non-party member receives
the tolling benefit for as long as the suit is maintained as a class
action or until he opts out under the provisions of 23(c) (2) (A).
Thus the commencement of a class action suit becomes an attractive
alternative to joinder without satisfying the numerousness requirement.
The class action was originally devised as a procedure by the
Equity Courts whereby persons so numerous as to make joinder
89. Id.

90. FED. R. Civ. P. 20,
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
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impracticable may be bound by a judgment in a "representative"
suit. 2 Evidently an individual had to be a member of a definitely
ascertainable class, his interest had to be identical with the interest
of members of the class, and all of those interests had to be adequately represented. It is difficult to argue, while standing in the
glow of Rule 23(a), that this is not the essence of a class action
under the present federal rules.
The above considerations are of critical importance to the issue
of whether the statute of limitations is tolled by the commencement of a class action. As Judge Fullam has illustrated above, if
all of the fundamental requirements are satisfied and the court
determines that the suit should not be maintained as a class action
because of judicial housekeeping reasons, it would only be fair to
conclude that the statute of limitations was tolled between commencement of the suit and the negative determination. If the
prerequisites were not satisfied, then "there never really was a
class to be represented, [and] members of the purported class can
scarcely be heard to claim that they started suit, vicariously, before the limitations period expired. '93 A reliance element could
temper the harshness of this result. Thus, where a class action is
dismissed for want of one of the fundamental requirements, a member of the class would be allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff
where he could demonstrate reliance on the class action for the full
adjudication of his interest.
Rule 23 specifically delineates the fundamental requirements of
a class action and included therein are the requirements of numerousness and adequate representation. If the statute of limitais to be tolled for the benefit of unnamed members of a class, the
suit must satisfy the fundamental requirements contained in 23(a).
DOUGLAS C. HOLLAND
92. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hut v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v.
Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
93. 43 F.R.D. at 461.

